I was recommended this book by a social science colleague whose judgment I trust. I certainly would not have bothered on my own, after reader her book with Wildavsky, which I found to be shallow and misguided (see my review of this book).Douglas's major thesis in this book is that the notion of rational action as the behavior of the socially isolated self-regarding actor is incorrect. Her alternative is that "mind is society writ small." That is, individual beliefs, desires, and hence actions, are the product of the individual's social connections and social experience, and have a strong other-regarding and ethical element of self-sacrifice on behalf of the group and its moral principles. She develops this theme with great eloquence, insight and erudition.Nevertheless, her arguments could have been stronger. Even thirty years ago, she would have benefitted from the incredibly powerful works of the sociologists Talcott Parsons and Ralph Linton (Douglas only recognizes the late Parsons, whereas the early Parsons of 1937 is relevant for her thesis). Moreover, she does not understand the scientific notion of rationality, as developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern as well as, even more critically, Leonard Savage (1954). In terms of modern decision theory, stemming from Savage, we would summarize her argument is that the subjective prior of rational choice theory must be replaced by a model in which beliefs are socially constructed. Most important, her critique of rational choice theory as necessarily self-regarding is completely incorrect.Douglas' stress on the importance of Durkheim is well-founded, but she does not find a way to overcome the most common objection to Durkheim, which is that its portrayal of society is completely functionalist---society functions when people agree on basic beliefs and conventions. This is simply incorrect. Societies can function quite well with serious ideational conflict (although general adherence to certain core principles tends to facilitate constructive social cooperation). I have argued that individuals are embedded in social networks of minds, and individual beliefs and knowledge are distributed over these networks. We may call this socially distributed cognition.Socially distributed cognition almost never takes the form of a single network of consonant information and values, and indeed, major forms of social change are the result of the clash of contrasting networks of social cognition. With this emendation, Douglas' brilliant argument makes much more sense.